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Cinderella Sovereignty 
Anna Gelpern1 
 
Abstract 
The Blocher-Gulati critique of the barriers to secession under public international law is 
insightful and thought-provoking, an important contribution in its own right. I wish it had not been 
eclipsed by the authors’ clever and provocative fix: turning sovereignty into a tradable commodity. 
I suspect that this fix would bring about more suffering than the status quo for two reasons. First, 
a market for sovereign control is unlikely to be a market in any meaningful sense. Therefore, 
trading sovereignty would not discipline oppressors. Second, should something like a real market 
materialize, it could diminish the incentives for states to treat their populations better just as 
plausibly as it could improve them. Distant empires could find it easier to traffic in oppressed 
people and territories, which would pass from state to state as their masters lose interest. A class 
of marginal client statelets would grow, endowed with a poor stepchild of sovereignty, which 
would leave their people defenseless and voiceless.  
 
 Introduction 
Are international lawyers too squeamish to let market forces save lives? This is the 
challenge at the heart of A Market for Sovereign Control. In their article, which is the centerpiece 
of a larger body of work, Joseph Blocher and Mitu Gulati observe that people suffer and die as a 
consequence of public international law’s heavy presumption in favor of territorial integrity for 
existing states, even in the face of humanitarian crises. 2 At best, this presumption might be 
overcome when a state’s government heinously abuses some of its people.3 If the abuse of an 
                                                     
1 I am grateful to Joseph Blocher and Mitu Gulati for encouraging this thought experiment and for their helpful 
comments, and to Alexander Dunn, Alexander Severance, and Emma Chapman for excellent research assistance. I 
owe special thanks to Marylin Raisch of the Georgetown Law Library for invaluable research advice. 
2 Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, A Market for Sovereign Control, 66 DUKE L.J. 797, 803 (2017). 
3 The Canadian Supreme Court in the Reference re Secession of Quebec case thus declared that ‘international law 
expects that the right to self-determination will be exercised by peoples within the framework of existing sovereign 
states and consistently with the maintenance of the territorial integrity of those states’ and that the right to unilateral 
secession ‘arises only in the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances’ (Re 
Reference by the Governor in Council concerning Certain Questions relating to the Secession of Quebec from 
Canada (1999) 115 ILR 536).  
In the 2006 Ahtisaari Plan, adopted by the UN Security Council to address ethnic conflict in Kosovo, the 
province would have a measure of autonomy short of statehood, in recognition of Serbia’s continuing territorial 
integrity claims. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter Dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc S/2007/168 (Mar. 26, 2007) [hereinafter U.N. Letter]. As late as 2012, 
even as Kosovo gained more trappings of a sovereign state, Serbia ensured that Kosovo’s international legal status 
came with an asterisk. Lidija Basta Fleiner & Vladimir Djeric, “Serbia” (para. 58) in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2962574 
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ethnic enclave is heinous enough, it might create an opening for remedial secession.4 However, 
the primacy of territorial integrity is so entrenched that even unspeakable human suffering—
“genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”—usually draws only the 
most cautious of challenges.5  
The authors argue that there would be less suffering if international law let the abused 
people pay to leave the abuser-state under conditions that fall short of the virtually unattainable 
standard for remedial secession. 6  The abused could either strike out on their own as a new 
sovereign state, or sell themselves to the highest acceptable bidder, joining another state that would 
adopt them as its own. The rule would shift from property (the abused belong to the abuser) to 
liability (the abused can walk away, but must pay the abuser).7 They say that the new rule would 
foster a market for sovereign control,8 which would create incentives for governments to abuse 
less, so that fewer people would suffer under oppressive rule and die fighting to escape it. 
 The authors rightly highlight the human costs of the prevailing legal regime. 9  Any 
presumption-based regime for secession would either condone more suffering or more political 
instability than most would prefer.  In today’s world, the abused people are bound to stay in their 
home state despite extreme abuse; exit is truly a remedy of last resort. If the presumption were 
                                                     
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012-current) (ebook) See also, Responsibility to Protect: 
The Lessons of Libya, THE ECONOMIST (May 19, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/18709571 (highlighting 
tensions between protecting human rights and territorial integrity). 
4 See U.N. Letter, supra note 3. 
5 In the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, world leaders at the United Nations accepted in para.139 that they 
“are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance 
with the [UN] Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional 
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” G.A. Res. 60/1, 
2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶ 139 (Oct. 24, 2005). Security Council Resolution 1674 of 28 April 2006 reaffirmed 
“the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” S.C. 
Res. 1674, ¶ 4 (Apr. 28, 2006). 
6 The authors use a too-sterile term, “welfare-enhancing border changes,” for their goal of territorial arrangements 
that kill, torture, and maim fewer people. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 800. 
7 Id. at 803. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (proposing a typology of entitlements). 
8 In the authors’ words, “Though  there  are  fundamental  differences,  the  idea  of  a  market  for  sovereign  
control shares features with the market for corporate control.” Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 800. See Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper  Role  of  a  Target’s  Management  in  Responding  to  a  Tender  
Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. 
ECON. 110 (1965). 
9 Supra note 2, at 843. 
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flipped, exit might turn into a remedy of first resort. Such a binary structure seems especially 
problematic in a world where the standards for ill-treatment are evolving and vigorously 
contested.10 It is not a comfortable space for line-drawing. 
The Blocher-Gulati critique is insightful and thought-provoking, an important contribution 
in its own right. I wish it had not been eclipsed by the authors’ clever and provocative fix: turning 
sovereignty into a tradable commodity. I suspect that this fix would bring about more suffering 
than the status quo for two reasons. First, a market for sovereign control is unlikely to be a market 
in any meaningful sense. Therefore, trading sovereignty would not discipline oppressors. Second, 
should something like a real market materialize, it could diminish the incentives for states to treat 
their populations better just as plausibly as it could improve them. Distant empires could find it 
easier to traffic in oppressed people and territories, which would pass from state to state as their 
masters lose interest. A class of marginal client statelets would grow, endowed with a poor 
stepchild of sovereignty, which would leave their people defenseless and voiceless.  
Here is the crux of my disagreement with the authors: they see the world as already full to 
capacity with poor stepchildren, and worry that the law would stand in the way of that one lucky 
waif—Cinderella Sovereign—who might otherwise be rescued by Prince Charming and find a 
happy home in his kingdom. If Prince Charming shows up on Cinderella Sovereign’s doorstep, 
glass slipper in hand, ready to pay ransom to her evil stepmother, why should the law keep them 
apart? It should not and, as other commentators have pointed out, it does not.11 The authors add 
little to the existing toolkit: at most, Cinderella would gain the legal right to elope when the 
stepmother would not let go at any price. The cost of this potential benefit to Cinderella is borne 
by the international system, which risks producing many more orphans than princesses under the 
Blocher-Gulati legal regime. The authors appear to assume implicitly that better behavior is the 
oppressor-state’s only plausible response to the risk of losing territory in a market for sovereign 
                                                     
10 See Statements made by representatives at the Plenary Session of the Sixty-Third United Nations General 
Assembly discussing various interpretations of the responsibility to protect, which can come in tension with states’ 
territorial integrity. Press Release, General Assembly, Delegates Weigh Legal Merits of Responsibility to Protect 
Concept as General Assembly Concludes Debate, U.N. Press Release GA/10850 (July 28, 2009).  
11 See e.g., John F. Coyle, Friendly and Hostile Deals in the Market for Sovereign Control: A Response to 
Professors Blocher and Gulati, 66 DUKE L.J. 37, 45-48 (2017) (highlighting that consensual transfers of territory are 
permissible, and do take place, under the prevailing international legal regime). In other words, if the stepmother 
could be bought off, she would take the money and let the waif go with the prince. Conversely, Coyle points out that 
Blocher and Gulati do not help Cinderella enforce her right to walk away from an unwilling stepmother. 
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control. They do not consider the possibility that the parent state would get more oppressive to 
push Cinderella out or to raise the price of her freedom. Furthermore, because the authors’ account 
ends with Cinderella and Prince Charming living happily ever after, they do not address the 
possibility of repeat trades, or trafficking in impaired sovereignty, once they make it easier for 
abusive parent states to raise revenue off secession. 
In the remainder of this Response, I begin by defining the problem the authors seek to 
address, and the shared assumptions underlying their argument and my response, in Part I. ed on 
these assumptions, Parts II and III of this Response examine my two principal concerns with the 
proposal: that a market for sovereign control would not be a market, and that, even if it were a 
market, it would bring about more suffering and less robust sovereignty for the very people the 
authors want to help. Part II describes perverse incentives for parents and acquirers in cases where 
a territory secedes from one state to join another. Part III considers an independence scenario, with 
no acquiring state, and further elaborates the attributes of “Cinderella Sovereignty” that could 
become more prevalent in a market for sovereign control. 
 
I. The Task and the Assumptions 
 It would be wrong to charge the authors with failing to solve the very problems that they 
do not attempt to solve, just as it would not do to assume a wildly different institutional setting 
from the one in which they situate their proposal. In an effort to avoid such pitfalls, I summarize 
my understanding of the task that Blocher and Gulati set for themselves, and some of the key 
assumptions embedded in their argument. 
 A Market for Sovereign Control addresses the problem of an ethnically or culturally distinct 
group of people inhabiting a defined geographic territory. 12  The authors do not take on the 
problems of bad governments or oppressed people in general. The seceding subset of a state’s 
population must be identifiable and reachable in order to ascertain its preferences and confer new 
citizenship.13 The territory to be transferred--along with its assets, such as natural resources,--
would need to be demarcated and valued, and its relationship to the oppressed people would need 
                                                     
12 Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 800-01. 
13 Id. at 817.  
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to be established.14 The parent entity from which the people would secede and to which they might 
owe compensation must be a state, not an oppressive tyrant acting in his personal capacity.15 It 
follows that the Blocher-Gulati proposal would fit neither Syria’s rebels fighting to overthrow 
Bashar Al Assad, nor the widely dispersed Roma people.16 It does not appear to address ancestral 
claims to land, where the people no longer occupy the territory that might be rightfully theirs—
not even in well-documented cases of wholesale forcible population transfers, such as some Native 
American nations, or the Crimean Tatars.17 On the other hand, it might aid Kurds in Iraq, or 
Russians concentrated in parts of eastern Ukraine.18  
 Like the authors, I generally bracket issues related to adjudication. For example, I assume 
that some international tribunal could determine the extent of oppression, the will of the oppressed 
people, the appropriate price of their sovereignty, and any other elements that might be necessary 
to apply the Blocher-Gulati secession doctrine. 19 While making this assumption, it is important to 
recognize that implementing the authors’ proposal would require an elaborate regime of fact-
finding, adjudication, monitoring, and enforcement beyond the current practice of the International 
Court of Justice, and that any forum charged with implementation would have to work much faster 
than the current international norm.20 A specialized tribunal with access to expert fact-finding 
                                                     
14 Id. at 818-20. 
15 Id. at 818 (noting that the entitlement to compensation is with the parent state). 
16 Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 841–42. For an account of the war in Syria, see, e.g., CHRISTOPHER PHILLIPS, 
THE BATTLE FOR SYRIA: INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY IN THE NEW MIDDLE EAST (2016). Despite its ethnic dimensions 
and the rebels’ intermittent control of some territory, the Syrian conflict is not over secession, but rather an attempt 
to overthrow an oppressive government. See, e.g., ELIZABETH FERRIS AND KEMAL KIRIŞCI, THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
CHAOS: SYRIA’S HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AND THE FAILURE TO PROTECT (2016). On the Roma, see, e.g., BECKY 
TAYLOR, ANOTHER DARKNESS, ANOTHER DAWN: A HISTORY OF GYPSIES, ROMA AND TRAVELLERS (2014). 
17 See also NORMAN M. NAIMARK, FIRES OF HATRED ETHNIC CLEANSING IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY EUROPE (2001), 
Ch.3 (resettlement of Crimean Tatars); GREGORY D. SMITHERS, THE CHEROKEE DIASPORA: AN INDIGENOUS 
HISTORY OF MIGRATION, RESETTLEMENT, AND IDENTITY (2015) (resettlement of Native Americans). 
18 On the Kurds, see KERIM YILDIZ, THE KURDS IN IRAQ: THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (2007) (chapters 8-9); 
Bill Park, IRAQ: Putting Kurds on the Map?, U.S. Naval War College, Turkish-Kurdish Regional Government 
Relations after the U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq: Putting the Kurds on the Map? (2014) at 20-22, 35, at 
https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo47612/pub1190.pdf. On the Russians in eastern Ukraine, see, e.g., Sabra 
Ayres, Residents in Eastern Ukraine Face Worst Fighting in Years in War with Russian-Backed Separatists, L.A. 
TIMES (Feb. 15, 2017, 2:45 PM), http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-east-ukraine-fighting-2017-story.html. 
Paul Stephan has pointed out that this frame creates incentives to ethnic consolidation. Paul B. Stephan, 
Blocher, Gulati, and Coase: Making or Buying Sovereignty?, 66 DUKE L.J. ONLINE  51, 62 (2017). 
19 The norm-setting and fact-finding challenges echo the Odious Debt debate. A. Mechele Dickerson, Insolvency 
Principles and the Odious Debt Doctrine: The Missing Link in the Debate, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 77 
(2007); see also Symposium, Odious Debts and State Corruption, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (2007).  
20 The average ICJ case takes four years to complete. I.C.J., Questions and Answers about the International Court of 
Justice 44 (2016), http://www.icj-cij.org/70/pdf/24b.pdf . 
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therefore may be more appropriate than any existing forum; however, it is harder to start new 
institutions than to expand the remit of the old.21 That said, the authors’ proposal does not depend 
on forum particulars; for their purposes and mine, these particulars can wait. 
 In sum, Blocher, Gulati, and I assume an ascertainable and accessible cultural minority 
population currently occupying a defined parcel of territory within a parent state, and an 
international institution capable of adjudicating governance quality, consent of the population 
(including procedural elements), and the price of sovereignty. I also assume, as do the authors, that 
the enforcement challenge for their liability rule is comparable to any other under public 
international law.22 
 
II. Thin Markets and Obsolescing Bargains: Sovereign Acquisitions 
 The market for sovereign control is meant to create and negotiate a space between parent 
states’ rights to territorial integrity and peoples’ rights to remedial secession. As the law currently 
stands, a parent holds its territory as property, and can transfer it without the inhabitants’ consent.23 
Meanwhile, the people of the territory can secede (if at all) only in response to extreme abuse at 
the hands of the parent. 24  Blocher and Gulati sensibly argue that this binary rule preempts 
potentially welfare-enhancing outcomes where the abuse falls short of extreme. 25  To fix the 
                                                     
21 Compare, e.g., Barbara Bean, Law of the Sea, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. (Apr. 27, 2015) 
https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/ERG_LOS.pdf (discussing the decades-long process of negotiating the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and establishing the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea), with the 9-
year Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations conducted under the auspices of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade that established the World Trade Organization. See Karen J. Alter, The Evolution of International 
Law and Courts, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM (Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti, and 
Adam Sheingate, eds., 2016) at 590-610. 
22 John Coyle highlights the challenge of enforcing non-consensual transfers of sovereignty against the parent state’s 
objections. Coyle, supra note 15. Because Blocher and Gulati generally avoid the enforcement issue, I take it as 
their assumption that enforcement of their liability rule would rely on the existing machinery of public international 
law. To the extent the authors believe that their scheme would be more enforceable than your average international 
commitment owing to the market incentives baked into it or any other factors, their article would benefit from a 
more explicit argument to that effect. 
23 Paul R. Williams, What Makes a State? Territory, 106 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 449 (2012); Cf. Steve R. Fisher, 
Towards “Never Again”: Searching for a Right to Remedial Secession Under Extant International Law, 22 BUFF. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 274–75 (2015) (describing a decision by a League of Nations Commission of Rapporteurs 
that principles of territorial sovereignty allowed Finland to block a referendum-backed secession by the Aaland 
Islands). 
24 Supra note 5.  
25 Blocher & Gulati, supra note 2, at 803. 
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problem, they would replace the binary rule with a three-bucket structure: in the first bucket, there 
is no oppression, but the parent or the minority wants to split up, and the two sides negotiate a 
mutually acceptable price;26 in the second, the parent is “oppressive or genocidal,” so naturally the 
minority wants to secede and may be able to do so under existing rules;27 in the third, the parent 
merely “denies representation or equal rights,” which would not be enough to justify secession 
today.28 The third bucket is where market forces would determine the price of sovereignty, by 
auction. In the alternative, the authoritative tribunal, presumably also using market-based metrics, 
would set the price.29  
In the remainder of Part II, I compare this proposal to its inspiration in corporate law 
literature, focusing on potential motives that might drive participants in the market for sovereign 
control. I conclude that any such market would be unlikely to produce robust price discovery. 
Using a hypothetical oppressed territory of Arcadia as an example, I then examine time-
inconsistency problems that could arise for parent states and potential acquirers, and make the 
oppressed people suffer more.  
 A. Corporate Control v. Sovereign Control 
This market for sovereign control does not look at all like its inspiration, the market for 
corporate control. The classic articles in the corporate control canon, from Professor Henry Manne 
in the 1960s30 to Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor David Fischel in the early 1980s,31 
address a highly liquid, competitive marketplace—the U.S. public equity market, where thousands 
of firms trade—with an argument premised on robust price discovery.32 An acquirer is willing to 
pay more for a controlling share in the target firm than the price at which its stock currently trades 
in the public market.33 The target firm’s management deploys all manner of contrivance to resist 
                                                     
26 Id. at 819. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 819-20. 
29 Id. at 821.  
30 Manne, supra note 8. 
31 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8; see also William J. Carney, The Legacy of “The Market for Corporate 
Control” and the Origins of the Theory of the Firm, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 215, 233-36 (1999). 
32 See e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 1166-67. There is also a robust lending market to finance 
acquisitions of control. 
33 “Control premiums” are a common feature of corporate acquisitions across jurisdictions. Tatiana Nenova, The 
Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 325 (2003). 
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the welfare-enhancing acquisition.34 Easterbrook and Fischel argue that the law should block 
management resistance in most cases.35 
 What would price discovery look like in a market for sovereign control? In a world of fewer 
than two hundred states, only a handful of which could and would bid for new territory, active 
trading is improbable. 36  Competitive bidding seems especially far-fetched where, under the 
Blocher-Gulati proposal, the acquirer must grant full citizenship to the people of the acquired 
territory.37 Such narrowly constrained acquisition terms, combined with the possibility of price-
setting by a public tribunal, are entirely sensible in light of the authors’ desire to advance human 
rights and democratic representation; however, they highlight the vast gap between their proposal 
and a conventional financial market that inspired it.  
Consider what might motivate a state to bid for territory in the market for sovereign control. 
First, there is kinship: the would-be acquirer’s population could share some combination of 
cultural, linguistic, and historical ties with the oppressed inhabitants of the target territory.38 This 
                                                     
34 See, e.g., Donald J. Wolfe et al., The Delaware Court of Chancery Reaffirms the Vitality of the Poison Pill in 
Airgas, INSIGHTS (Mar. 2011).  
35 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 1199–1204. 
36 Territorial expansion is analogous to a major capital investment. Most countries are simply not in the market for 
new territory at any given time. In addition, as I highlight in the remainder of this Part I.A, potential acquirers are 
driven by a limited set of motives such as kinship and access to particular resources, which limit the number of 
suitable acquisition targets. 
Mark Weidemaier highlights the thinness of any plausible market; he also points out that governments do 
not trade sovereignty even where they are currently unconstrained by law—as the authors acknowledge. W. Mark C. 
Weidemaier, A (Very Thin) Market for Sovereign Control, 66 DUKE L. J. ONLINE 67, 72 (2017). On the limited 
efficiency of thin markets, see, e.g., Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and Financial Stability in 
Emerging Markets, IMF GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 2016, ch. 3; Emmanuel O. Nwosu, Anthony Orji & 
Ogomegbunam Anagwu, African Emerging Equity Markets Re‐examined: Testing the Weak Form Efficiency 
Theory, 25 AFR. DEV. REV. 485 (2013); Musarrat Shamshir & Khalid Mustafa, Efficiency in Stock Markets: A 
Review of Literature, 2 INT’L J. ECON., COM & MGMT. 1-22 (2014), http://ijecm.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/21232.pdf. 
37 Weidemaier argues that governments can now trade elements of the sovereignty “bundle” relatively freely, which 
may account for their lack of interest in “bundled sovereignty.” Weidemaier, supra note 36. For example, granting 
full citizenship to the residents of the acquired territory would give them the right to move within the acquiring 
country. While public opinion about immigrants in destination countries is not necessarily a close proxy for what 
might ensue in a Blocher-Gulati acquisition of a distant land, it is instructive: a 2015 report by the International 
Organization for Migration found that 47% of respondents in top 10 destination countries for migrants supported 
decreasing immigration, while only 15% were in favor of increasing. Neli Esipova et al., International Organization 
for Migration, HOW THE WORLD VIEWS MIGRATION 14 (2015), 
http://publications.iom.int/system/files/how_the_world_gallup.pdf. 
38 For example, the majority of Albanians favor a “greater Albania,” which would comprise all areas where ethnic 
Albanians live, including Albania, Kosovo, and parts of Macedonia. GALLUP BALKAN MONITOR, 2010 SUMMARY OF 
FINDINGS 47 (2010). Similarly, a 2014 survey shows strong support among South Koreans for unification of the 
peninsula. Steven Denney, The Generation Gap on Korean Unification, DIPLOMAT, Jan. 29, 2015, 
9 
 
is where a blanket grant of citizenship would seem most plausible, since the acquiring state’s 
people are eager to welcome their long-lost kin, and ready to bear the costs of acquisition and 
integration.39 It is also where the universe of bidders is the smallest, perhaps limited to one or two 
neighboring states. To describe it as a market at all would be a stretch. 
At the other extreme, an acquiring state might seek new territory for commercial reasons: 
natural resources, access to trade routes, or simply land to accommodate its own growing 
population.40 Unlike the kinship example, it is easy to imagine many rich states scrambling to bid 
for a well-located, well-endowed breakaway enclave, in the fashion of 19th-century imperial 
contests.41 In a commercially-motivated trade, the acquiring state’s population would be less likely 
to support full citizenship for complete strangers in a distant place.42 The Blocher-Gulati baseline 
of granting full citizenship rights to the oppressed would operate as a binding constraint on 
acquisition terms in this case: even if the trade made economic sense, its domestic political costs 
to the acquirer may be prohibitive.43 Given the option of leasing or buying particular assets in the 
target territory from the current parent state—which would require no change in the law—the 
acquirer might forgo a full-blown sovereignty trade.44 
                                                     
http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/the-generation-gap-on-korean-unification/. East and West Germans, polled shortly 
after the reunification of their country, expressed overwhelming support for the outcome. Chapter 5. Views of 
German Reunification, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 2, 2009), http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/11/02/chapter-5-views-of-
german-reunification/.  
39 Even this is optimistic, however. A 2014 survey showed that only half of South Koreans would be willing to bear 
the cost of unification of the peninsula, despite overwhelming majorities supportive of unification generally. South 
Korea Says Economic Cost of Unification Would be $500bn, GUARDIAN, Nov. 19, 2014, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/19/south-korea-cost-unification-500bn. The costs of reunification can 
be substantial, and come without a guarantee of success. German reunification cost $1.6 trillion euros, and opinion 
polls have found that many Germans still do not feel they live in a united country. Erik Kirschbaum, The Dark Side 
of German Reunification, REUTERS (Sept. 29, 2010), http://blogs.reuters.com/global/2010/09/29/the-dark-side-of-
german-reunification/.  
40See Antony Anghie, The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Post-Colonial Realities, 27 THIRD WORLD 
QUARTERLY 739, 742-46 (2006). Weidemaier cites contemporary cases where states leased real estate, obtained 
project concessions, and generally acquired elements of the “sovereignty bundle” from other states to accommodate 
the needs of their growing domestic economies. Weidemaier, supra note 36 at 72.  
41 See Anghie, supra note 41. See also, generally, Roger Southall, Scrambling for Africa? Continuities and 
Discontinuities with Formal Imperialism, in A NEW SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA? 1 (ROGER SOUTHALL & HENNING 
MELBER EDS., 2009) 
42 Supra note 37.  
43 See John F. Coyle, Friendly and Hostile Deals in the Market for Sovereign Control: A Response to Professors 
Blocher and Gulati, 66 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 37, 40–43 (2017). 
44 Weidemaier, supra note 36 (arguing that states prefer to buy or lease discrete assets and privileges to full-blown 
sovereignty acquisition). As is the case under existing law, the oppressed people would remain oppressed, losing 
their most valuable endowments in the bargain. 
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Other acquisition motives, such as altruism (saving the oppressed) and security (buying a 
strategic asset), are no more likely to produce competitive bidding for many of the same reasons.45 
In particular, domestic support for paying the cost of acquisition and integration would be hard to 
muster in either case.46   
In sum, a market where states must extend full citizenship to the people of acquired 
territories would be vanishingly thin, and unlikely to produce robust price discovery with its 
associated incentive effects. On the other hand, if the citizenship constraint were relaxed, it would 
risk producing a category of second-class subjects—contrary to the authors’ stated objective.47  
B. Time Inconsistencies 
In addition to being thin, a market for sovereign acquisition would also be prone to a time-
inconsistency problem: governments might make decisions in the near term that may not serve 
their longer-term interests. Promises made at the time of acquisition are unlikely to stand. Consider 
a kinship-driven acquisition. Suppose that two countries, acquirer and parent, are vying for the 
affections of the Arcadia territory. Both have historical, ethnic, or cultural ties with Arcadia.48 
Some years after it receives and spends an up-front lump sum for Arcadia, the old parent might 
come to miss the lost child: after all, secession does not erase the historical, ethnic, or cultural 
affinity between the people of Arcadia and their ex-compatriots. Domestic political pressure for 
                                                     
45 A majority of the top ten destination countries for migrants spend less on development assistance as a percentage 
of their gross national income than the average OECD country. Supra note 38; Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Development Aid in 2015 Continues to Grow Despite Costs for In-donor Refugees 6 
(2016), http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ODA-2015-detailed-summary.pdf.  Even the most altruistic nations spend 
only a small fraction of their gross national income on aid—which does not require their citizens to accept and 
integrate strangers. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, supra. Sweden, Norway, 
Luxembourg, and Denmark have the highest aid spending, while Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Spain 
spend the least. Id. U.S. opinion polls show a majority against increasing military spending or foreign aid. Pew 
Research Center, Public Uncertain, Divided over America’s Place in the World 1, 21 (2016), http://www.people-
press.org/files/2016/05/05-05-2016-Foreign-policy-APW-release.pdf. European polls show an even greater aversion 
to increased military spending, while a soft majority of 53% support increasing foreign aid budgets. Pew Research 
Center, Key Findings on how Europeans See Their Place in the World (2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/06/13/key-findings-europe/. 
46 Id. 
47 The most miserably oppressed might even prefer second-class citizenship in a reasonably benign state to living 
under a brutal tyrant; however, this scenario would be inconsistent with the authors’ essential objective of securing 
equal treatment for the seceding people, and would certainly not comport with existing human rights norms. See, 
e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 7, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) 
(“All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law”). 
48 Compare the territory of Alsace-Lorraine, which passed between Germany and France several times in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries.  
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Arcadia’s return would grow in the old parent state. To mollify its constituents, the old parent 
might try to extract some more money from the new parent, foment unrest in the breakaway 
territory, threaten to invade, or all of the above. Russian-linked violence in eastern Ukraine 
illustrates the possibility.49 In an optimistic scenario, such territorial competition might serve as 
an incentive for the new parent to treat the Arcadians well, consistent with the authors’ objective. 
It could also exacerbate instability and lead to a series of hold-up scenarios, with Arcadia 
perennially bouncing between two larger states. 50  Commercial, military-strategic, and even 
altruistic acquisitions could follow the same pattern. In a legal regime that makes transfers easier, 
a parent state is free to change its mind after getting paid for the breakaway territory. Unless 
Blocher and Gulati further constrain the new market, Arcadia could become an attractive source 
of budget revenue for the parent, as it is sold and repurchased, leased and bought back, pledged 
and rehypothecated. 
The acquirer also faces time-inconsistency problems. Suppose a wealthy state buys Arcadia 
to gain a foothold in a vital region, or a buffer against adversaries. Some years later, the acquirer’s 
strategic imperatives have changed. Meanwhile, Arcadia has become a drain on the new parent’s 
treasury, and Arcadians are migrating to the metropolis in droves to escape poverty, taking 
advantage of their full citizenship rights. The acquirer’s population is grumbling. Arcadia turns 
out to be an “obsolescing bargain.”51 Should it go back on the auction block? Should it just be cut 
loose, left to fend for itself? And if it does not want to leave, should it be nudged out with a bit of 
maltreatment, paid to exit, or both? 52 Obsolescence scenarios can also arise in altruistic and 
resource-driven acquisitions. They might be less likely in a kinship case, simply because it assumes 
a less contingent, more durable link between the acquirer and the target.  
                                                     
49 See Ayres, supra note 19. 
50 To wit, Alsace-Lorraine was made part of Germany in 1871, returned to France after World War I, was annexed 
by Germany on the eve of World War II, and went back to France thereafter. Alsace-Lorraine, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA https://www.britannica.com/place/Alsace-Lorraine (last updated Dec. 10, 2015). 
51 The term became popular beginning in the early 1970s to describe capital-intensive foreign investment in 
developing countries, where large-scale up-front expenditure created incentives for later nationalization. Raymond 
Vernon, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY:  THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S.  ENTERPRISES 46-53 (1971) (pioneering the 
term). See also Erik J. Woodhouse, The Obsolescing Bargain Redux? Foreign Investment in the Electric Power 
Sector in Developing Countries, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 121, 127-28 (2006) (discussing the origins of the 
“obsolescing bargain” and investor responses). 
52 See Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Forced Secessions (Sept. 21, 2016) (working paper) 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6382&context=faculty_scholarship. 
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In the market for corporate control, it is not particularly disturbing to see asset bundles or 
entire firms repeatedly passing from one owner to the next, so long as they are run more efficiently 
with each transfer.53 In its sovereign counterpart, the political instability attending successive 
transfers would be a serious matter, likely to reverberate beyond the immediate transaction 
participants.  
* * * 
In sum, implementing the Blocher-Gulati proposal would not lead to a competitive 
acquisition market capable of disciplining abusive governments. It could facilitate some territorial 
transfers that would not happen under the current regime, albeit on non-market terms. Because 
parent and acquirer preferences are likely to change over time, the proposed framework could lead 
to further political instability and more oppression, as the territory becomes a pawn in power games 
among bigger players. In the worst--case scenario, instead of having big countries compete for 
their affections, as Blocher and Gulati intend, the abused people and their territory might be 
shunted from one reluctant master to the next.54  
 
III. Cinderella Sovereignty 
 What if Arcadia chose to buy independence, rather than join an existing state? It could 
finance this bid with its own funds (unlikely if it is oppressed), loans or grants from other 
(sponsoring) states, bank loans, private capital markets borrowing, or charitable donations. A well-
located or well-endowed Arcadia might well attract multiple sponsors for its independence. Most 
bids would be driven by some mix of commercial and strategic motives; however, altruistic bidders 
might also participate. 55  Larger, wealthy states might find sponsorship more attractive than 
                                                     
53 See e.g., Gregor Andrade et al., New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 105, 116-19 
(2001) (presenting evidence that corporate mergers are becoming more common, with successive mergers associated 
with more efficient deployment of corporate assets). 
54 What if the people of the territory do not want to leave? In one of the companion pieces, the authors observe that 
public international law and U.S. federal jurisprudence appear to permit expulsion; they argue that the expelled 
people should receive compensation under some circumstances. See supra note 51, at 14-16. In this case, it would be 
cheaper for the parent to “persuade” the people to leave of their own accord by resorting to the very kind of 
repression and ill treatment that Blocher & Gulati seek to relieve in A Market for Sovereign Control. 
55 The role of altruism in foreign aid has been vigorously debated. Compare, Carlos Seiglie, Altruism, Foreign Aid 
and Humanitarian Military Intervention, 17 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT & PEACE STUDIES 207 (1999) (positing 
altruism as a core motivation for foreign aid), with Eric A. Posner, International Law: A Welfarist Approach, 73 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 487, 521-22 (2006) (describing cross-border altruism as “minimal”). 
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acquisition, since a sponsor does not have to grant citizenship or make a permanent commitment 
to the oppressed population, and could negotiate additional favorable sponsorship terms on the 
side. For private and charitable funders, financing independence would be the most direct way to 
get involved in the market for sovereign control.  
If a funder’s motives are purely altruistic, it might sponsor Arcadia’s exit without asking 
for anything in return—or might require the new government to observe human rights, 
environmental, and development safeguards. Private investors and states that seek to advance their 
own economic or strategic interests might insist on commercial privileges, political allegiance, and 
other forms of payback.56 A long-term loan from a sponsoring government to buy Arcadia’s 
independence might be tied formally or informally to air base access, diplomatic cooperation, 
exclusive mining concessions, below-market oil sales, or a combinations of these and similar 
conditions. The seceding people’s quid pro quo with a private funder might entail similar 
commercial concessions, exemptions from labor and environmental laws, and other commercial 
benefits. To guard against time-inconsistent behavior on the part of Arcadia, the funders might 
structure the financing so that the new government remains bound to them after the secession—
for example, disbursing money over time or taking control of valuable assets until the loan is 
repaid.  
In more abstract terms, the people of Arcadia would mortgage their voice in the new 
sovereign state in order to exit the old parent state.57 Sovereign Arcadia’s domestic politics would 
be constrained to meet the demands of those who funded its secession. Until it can stand on its 
own and cut the ties with its funders, Arcadia would enjoy a constrained form of sovereignty. 
Meanwhile, new funders might decide to make a play for Arcadia’s resources or loyalties. If the 
bidders keep coming, Arcadia might have more scope to negotiate favorable deals, securing more 
domestic political autonomy. Then again, if Arcadia were such a prize, the old parent would want 
a higher price for letting it exit in the first place. 
                                                     
56 The idea of tying foreign aid expressly to commercial privileges for donors is hardly new.  See, e.g., Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Development Co-operation Directorate, Untied Aid, 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/untied-aid/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2017). A market for sovereignty would expand the scope 
for such arrangements. 
57 See generally, Albert O. Hirschman, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).  
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To be sure, Blocher and Gulati did not invent the problem of compromised sovereignty, 
which is commonplace under the prevailing international legal regime. Examples range from 
nominally independent Abkhazia and Ossetia, sandwiched between Russia and Georgia, to U.S. 
territories such as Puerto Rico and Guam, which enjoy a subset of sovereign attributes accruing to 
U.S. states and sovereign nations.58  
The story of Nauru illustrates the extent to which states can already mortgage their 
sovereignty under international law. The tiny island had no shortage of suitors: Germany, 
Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom had all asserted military and commercial 
claims over Nauru since the 19th century.59 A German colony, then an Australian protectorate 
under the League of Nations and the United Nations trusteeship system, Nauru had rich phosphate 
deposits, which even after decades of exploitation by foreign powers, helped finance its 
independence in 1968. 60  When the phosphate ran out, leaving the island an environmental 
wasteland, the government turned to a succession of short-term revenue measures that eventually 
turned it into “an archetypal ‘client state’” of Australia.61 Today, Nauru hosts detention camps for 
refugees rejected by Australia, where conditions are dismal and accusations of human rights 
violations abound.62  
                                                     
58 See e.g., Gerard Toal & John O’Loughlin, How People in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria Feel About 
Annexation by Russia, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2014) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2014/03/20/how-people-in-south-ossetia-abkhazia-and-transnistria-feel-about-annexation-by-
russia/?utm_term=.16185560e441 (reporting on Ossetia and Abkhazia). See generally,  BARTHOLOMEW H. 
SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (2006) (analyzing U.S. jurisprudence 
that granted only abridged citizenship rights to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico, Guam, and other islands taken over by 
the United States after the Spanish-American war); Christina Duffy Burnett, United States: American Expansion and 
Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797 (2005); see also Blocher & Gulati, supra note 51, at 14-15; Eric 
A. Posner, The Limits of Limits, The New Republic (May 5, 2010) https://newrepublic.com/article/74824/the-limits-
limits-0 (inter alia, on the compromised sovereignty of U.S.-controlled territories in the wake of the Spanish-
American war).  
59 Antony Anghie, The Heart of My Home: Colonialism, Environmental Damage, and the Nauru Case, 34 HARV. 
INT'L. L. J. 445, 449-454 (1993). 
60 Id. 
61 Id.; see also, Ben Doherty, A Short History of Nauru, Australia’s Dumping Ground for Refugees, THE GUARDIAN, 
Aug. 9, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/10/a-short-history-of-nauru-australias-dumping-
ground-for-refugees; Anthony Anghie, Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, 87 THE AM. J. OF INT’L L. 282 (1993); 
Keri Phillips, How Nauru Threw it all Away, ABC, Mar. 11, 2014, 
http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/rearvision/how-nauru-threw-it-all-away/5312714; Certain Phosphate 
Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Summary of the Judgment (June 26, 1992), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=413&p1=3&p2=3&case=80&p3=5. 
62 Id.; See also Daniel Flitton, Push to Charge Operators of Private Companies for Alleged Abuses on Nauru and 
Manus, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Feb. 13, 2017), http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/push-
to-charge-operators-of-private-companies-for-alleged-abuses-on-nauru-and-manus-20170213-gublsk.html.  
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All else equal, a competitive market for sovereign control should make it easier to create 
more Naurus, endowed with variants of its securitized rump sovereignty. A rule that allows 
oppressed ethnic groups inhabiting discrete territories to buy their right to secede may lead to 
robust sovereignty when the outside buyers and sponsors are driven by altruism or kinship—the 
Cinderella-Meets-Prince Charming scenario. However, it would be hard to limit potential bidders 
to Prince Charming. Such a limit would do away with any pretense of a market or market 
discipline. This might be just as well, since in a real market, where funders are motivated by self-
interest, they would have powerful incentives to create nominally independent captive states, and 
to prevent them from becoming self-sufficient—lest their loyalties weaken before the funders lose 
interest. The new states’ sovereignty would be a poor stepchild of the real thing. 
Conclusions 
 Joseph Blocher and Mitu Gulati identify an important problem: the existing binary regime 
does a poor job of managing the trade-off between territorial integrity and the rights of minority 
groups to live free from oppression, and to enjoy democratic governance and full freedom of 
political expression. The heavy presumption in favor of territorial integrity promotes external 
stability at the expense of the oppressed people. Their proposal would open the possibility of 
secession for ethnic groups inhabiting defined territories, without the parent state’s consent and 
under circumstances that do not reach the extreme level of oppression used to justify exit under 
the status quo. 
 A market for sovereign control is an elegant and provocative solution to the problem the 
authors have identified. If they can show that it would result in less human suffering and more 
human flourishing--if those liberated from oppression outnumber those who suffer more abuse or 
abridged sovereignty in the market for sovereign control—the proposal should be adopted. I am 
skeptical that the proposal could deliver on its promise of a robust market, and worry that it is 
wildly optimistic in the picture of sovereignty it paints for the oppressed. In this Response, I have 
suggested that the number of potential bidders for sovereign control in any given case would be 
tiny, effectively eliminating price as a mechanism to convey information and discipline market 
actors. Where one state acquires territory from another and extends citizenship to the territory’s 
inhabitants, the bidders would most likely be limited to states that share the same language, culture, 
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or history. Others would have a hard time mobilizing domestic political support for absorbing 
strangers en masse. 
 There may be more willing sponsors for a territory that seeks to become a state in its own 
right. However, the result is likely to be a second-class “Cinderella sovereignty,” where the new 
state remains heavily dependent on outside support, and funders extract commercial and security 
concessions. Only when the sponsor is purely altruistic would the authors’ desired outcome 
prevail—a non-violent exit followed by full sovereignty. In cases of kinship, eventual acquisition 
is more likely.  
 When the motive is altruistic, support may be hard to maintain. Circumstances change, 
funders lose interest, parent states want more money, or else try to get their old land back using 
force and disruption. Unless the new sovereign economy has become self-sufficient by the time 
the sponsor quits, the young government may have to search for new patrons, shuttling from one 
to another, dissipating its chances of building a healthy domestic political system, and threatening 
external stability. 
 In sum, a market for sovereign control would be a tall order, even assuming improbably 
robust enforcement and expert, authoritative adjudication. With or without a real market, the 
Blocher-Gulati rule would have important consequences for states and groups: more people and 
territories would change hands. However, it is hard to know in the abstract whether the rule would 
be an improvement on the status quo, whether it would lead to fewer orphans and less suffering 
than the old. The authors do not show that it would. As a result, there is no telling whether the 
benefits of letting altruistic sponsors and generous kin buy freedom for the oppressed would 
exceed the costs of letting the cynical buy dependent, powerless clients. The authors could avoid 
many uncomfortable questions by simply abandoning the pretense of a market, and lowering the 
bar to secession under international law, subject to robust human rights safeguards—but that would 
strike at the heart of the project. Until then, it would be reasonable to expect more trading at the 
margin in a Blocher-Gulati legal regime—and to expect glass slippers to remain exceedingly rare 
in a world teeming with poor orphans. 
 
Table 1 
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Acquisition 
Motive 
Competitive 
Bidding 
Likely Exit 
Scenario 
Acquirer/Sponsor 
Citizenship 
Time 
Inconsistency Voice 
Kinship Thin Join acquirer Yes Yes (parent) Yes 
Altruism Thin Independence No 
Yes (support for 
continued 
sponsorship 
weakens over 
time) 
Yes 
Resource Yes Cinderella sovereignty No 
Yes 
(acquirer/sponsor 
loses interest as 
its need or 
target’s 
resources 
diminish) 
No 
Strategic Yes Cinderella sovereignty No 
Yes 
(acquirer/sponsor 
loses interest as 
its strategic 
needs change) 
No 
  
 
